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Abstract 
 
 
In the context of the wine industry, we investigate producers’ choice between geographical 
indications and brand advertising to convey information to consumers. Producers also decide 
whether or not to select an effort level for improving the quality of their products. We show that 
if this effort level is selected, a producer will prefer to rely on brand advertising for promoting its 
products and setting up its own reputation. Despite allowing the cost of promotion to be shared, a 
geographical indication does not sufficiently reward the effort to improve quality. Finally, the 
selection of both instruments by producers is examined. 
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Introduction 
Wine promotion has been modified recently with the emergence of “new-world” wine from 
Australia, California, and Chile. Wineries from these countries mainly use individual brand 
advertising (BA) to promote quality perception, while more traditional European wineries mainly 
rely on geographical indications (GIs) for signaling the quality of their products. Foreign 
consumers in Europe are often baffled by the profusion of wine GIs. Reliance on GIs to promote 
food and beverage products is widespread in Europe not only for wine but also for cheese, meat, 
and other products. For instance, nearly 700 products are registered with the European 
designations system under the so-called Protected Designation of Origin and Protected 
Geographical Indication (EC, 2006). These differences raise the issue of the efficiency of the GI 
system for promoting food products relative to the merits of BA. 
We analyze the complex interaction between BA and GI and the rewards to quality 
improvements. We identify the relative effectiveness of BA and GI to reward producers1 for 
improvements in quality of their products, using a stylized framework linking product promotion 
and quality efforts. In a two-period model, BA and GI enhance the quality perception and the 
willingness to pay of consumers. The BA allows a producer to develop an individual reputation. 
The GI allows producers to share the cost of promotion and to develop a common reputation. 
Besides the choice of BA or GI, producers choose whether or not to make an effort to improve 
the overall quality level that affects the consumers’ purchase decision in the second period. Both 
signal and effort strategies influence the producers’ profits.  
Wine production is notoriously stochastic, with “good” and “bad” years, and taste 
attributes vary. New technologies allow control of the consistency of taste attributes (e.g., 
                                                          
1 Producers denote the supply chain (producers, wineries, firms) supplying wine to consumers. 
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controlled fermentation, varietal mix, and use of wood chips). These improvements are examples 
of what we mean by efforts to improve quality, i.e., investments in costly processes to improve 
the expected hedonic quality of a wine. We show that if the effort for improving quality is 
selected, a producer will prefer to rely on BA for promoting its products and setting up its own 
reputation. Despite the sharing of the cost of promotion, a GI does not sufficiently reward the 
effort for improving quality because of the common reputation. Conversely, when the producer 
avoids the effort, the GI is selected. Producers take advantage of sharing of the cost of promotion 
under collective reputation. 
This paper is linked to two separate strands of the literature. The first strand includes 
numerous papers on quality signaling. The latter mainly considers prices (e.g., Mahenc, 2004) or 
advertising (e.g., Fluet and Garella, 2002) to signal higher quality. The second and more recent 
strand focuses on GI and collective reputation (e.g., Marette and Crespi, 2003; Zago and Pick, 
2004; and Winfree and McCluskey, 2005). In this literature, producers’ coordination or even 
price collusion through a GI may be necessary to improve quality when the fixed costs of 
certification or quality improvements are large. Our framework differs because we simplify the 
consumers’ belief in higher quality by considering BA and GI as persuasive tools that change 
consumers’ preferences. In addition, our framework contributes to the more recent strand of 
literature. Here, we abstract from any price collusion linked to a GI and introduce the possibility 
that producers chose to use BA. Indeed, our paper addresses the question of the relative 
efficiency of collective signals compared to that of a private brand and the possible combination 
of both instruments, an issue that was previously overlooked in the literature. 
The next section expands on our contention that the emergence of “new-world” wine has 
relied on BA in contrast to the reliance of European wine on GIs. Then, in the third section, we 
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introduce the model. The main results are presented in the fourth section, while the fifth provides 
some extensions, and the final section offers conclusions. An appendix provides detailed 
derivations of results presented in the text. 
 
Promotion Strategies in the Wine Market  
In the last 15 years, globalization and trade liberalization have entailed a new context of 
competition. While world consumption of wine has been increasing (WHO, 2006), wine exports 
of European countries such as France and Italy have leveled off. Conversely, the exports of 
Australia, Chile, Argentina, and the United States have steadily gained ground, as shown in 
Figure 1, and markedly so in recent years.2 The European domination is being challenged by new 
producers from Chile and Australia. This new competition has modified strategies for signaling 
and promotion in the wine market (BA versus GI), accompanied by differences in cost structure, 
industry structure, and wine technology. The intellectual challenge is to elucidate the individual 
effect of these various elements. We focus on the noticeable efforts of these emerging 
competitors to improve quality through consistency and predictability of taste and the crucial 
role of their marketing strategies. The following stylized facts allow us to understand the 
differences between producers in Europe and in the emergent countries.3 
First, several types of information such as the winery, the grape, or the origin are usually 
mentioned on most bottles. However, for a buyer, the most visible information in France is the 
GI for medium-quality wines, and the cumulative GI (appellation, grand cru, etc.) combined with 
the winery (“chateau”) for high-quality wines. Conversely, the brand is the most visible 
                                                          
2 Note that this figure exhibits aggregated volumes that neglect segmentation and quality heterogeneity. 
3 The stylized facts mainly concerned consumption wines that differ from collectible wines reserved to experts 
(Costanigro et al., 2005). 
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information for the Australian wines (e.g., Jacob’s Creek, 2005). Wine promotion in Australia, 
Chile, and the United States favors private BA, which facilitates individual reputation and 
recognition by buyers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Basis Data Source: UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database. 
Figure 1. Wine exports value (basis 100 in 1990) 
 
Second, the profusion and proliferation of GIs in Europe lead to some risks of confusion 
for consumers (Marette and Zago, 2003). Peri and Gaeta (1999) count more than 400 official 
appellations in the wine sector in Italy, 450 appellations in France, and 1,397 in the wine sector 
in Europe. Such profusion assures product diversity but certainly increases buyer confusion 
(Consumer Reports, 1997). The recognition of quality labels by French consumers is only 12% 
for Appellations d’Origine Contrôlée, the French GI system for high-quality products (Loisel and 
Couvreur, 2001). Berthomeau (2002) discusses the difficulty that some French GIs have in 
entering new export markets because of the absence of any clear specification of the label that 
0
5
10
15
20
25
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
Year
Argentina
Australia
Chile
France
Italy
US
 5
distinguishes one appellation from another in consumers’ minds.4 In sharp contrast, Jacob’s 
Creek and Kendall Jackson wines can be found in most U.S. grocery stores.  
Third, many European GIs impose numerous restrictions that often stifle the search for 
commercial efficiency and innovations in quality that would improve the predictability in taste 
and consistency over time. Grape production is regulated, with a maximum yield allowed per 
unit of land. Excessive regulation for linking origin and quality seems problematic when the 
international competition is intense (Zago and Pick, 2004; and Ribaut, 2005). Conversely, the 
main features of regulations in the United States, Chile, and Australia are the lack of detailed 
rules and the freedom to experiment with new techniques; the production and marketing of wines 
according to single varieties of grapes, sometimes associated with a relatively large production 
region; and an intense use of marketing investments.5  
Fourth, wineries in Australia are much bigger than the ones in Europe, and the industry in 
the “new world” has been dominated by relatively large producers. The average vineyard size in 
France is less than 2 hectares compared with 111 hectares in Australia. Four producers dominate 
the Australian market, namely, Foster, Southcorp, Hardy, and Orlando Wyndham. The combined 
production share of the four largest producers in New Zealand is 85%, while the combined 
production share of the two largest producers in South Africa is 80%. Unlike the industry in 
Australia, Chile, or other new world competing countries, the wine industry in Europe is 
fragmented. Indeed, apart from some notable exceptions, e.g., Champagne (The Economist, 
                                                          
4 The collective reputation of French wines plummeted during the last decade (Conan, 2005; Echikson, 2005; and 
Ribaut, 2005). Giraud-Heraud et al. (2002) and Ribaut (2005) mentioned the need for winery consolidation and/or 
reform of the French GI system. 
5 In September 2005, the United States and the European Union reached a wine-trade agreement that makes some 
U.S. practices, such as adding wood chips to wine barrels, legitimate in the European Union. U.S. companies will 
stop using some GIs, such as Champagne, Sherry, and Port. Some EU lawmakers are not satisfied with this 
agreement because the European wine industry is strictly regulated and emphasizes traditional practices, while the 
U.S. industry emphasizes new technology that allows better control of taste characteristics and their identification by 
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2003), the wine industry in Europe is made up of many small producers that often lack adequate 
capital for the necessary investments in new technologies and marketing policies. In other words, 
small wineries are unable to reach the minimum-efficient scale since the quality improvement 
implies relatively large fixed costs. 
Beyond these empirical facts, further effects of the origin and the role of the GI are less 
easily evaluated. Despite the limits previously mentioned, GI also indicates natural conditions 
such as the soils and the climate specific to a certain geographic area (Barham, 2003). Origins of 
product matters for consumers’ purchase decisions. Orth et al. (2005) show that the origin of a 
bottle does affect the U.S. consumers’ preference, as shown in Table 1.6  
 
Table 1. Consumers’ preference for wine origin 
Origin Mean rank Standard Deviation
California 3.03 1.95 
France 3.88 2.49 
Italy 4.38 2.18 
Australia 4.67 2.51 
Oregon 4.78 2.55 
Chile 5.75 2.32 
Spain 5.87 1.98 
Washington 6.02 2.42 
New Zealand 6.51 1.89 
Source: Table 1 in Orth, Wolf, and Dodd (2005). 
Note: Scale from 1 = most preferred to 9 = least preferred 
 
However, GIs can be an efficient tool for signaling collective reputation. The Champagne 
GI is an example of successful collective reputation in which the combination of famous brands 
(with large vineyard size and enough capital for advertising) and a prestigious GI matters for 
consumers ready to pay a large premium (Combris et al., 2003). Orth and Krska (2002) show 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
consumers (Locke, 2005). 
6 It should be noted that the origin in Table 1 corresponds to countries or U.S. states, as that would be the case for 
GIs in France or Italy, associations that often concern sub-regions or small areas. 
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that consumers rank country and region of origin at the top of wine attributes, while the producer 
name is lower. An “efficient” combination of brands and GI also characterizes the Napa Valley 
appellation, which generates a significant price premium compared to an equivalent-quality 
bottle with a different appellation (Bombrun and Sumner, 2003). The efficiency of GI compared 
to that of a private brand is an open question. Some empirical studies of wine have elucidated 
consumers’ attitudes towards GIs and brands. With a parametric hedonic approach, Steiner 
(2004) shows that the decline of French wine in the British market is partly due to the 
consumers’ low valuation of geographical appellation. Riley et al. (1999) show a positive 
correlation between consumers’ attitudes (and perceptions) and relative brand size in the British 
wine market.  
The debate about the strategies of producers and the appropriate regulation will likely 
gain momentum. This last point leads directly to the focus of our paper. Although the choice 
among tools for improving quality raises many questions, we focus on the central link between 
an effort for improving quality and different tools for quality signaling (BA versus GI and a 
combination of both). A stylized model is used to isolate the impact of alternative ways to signal 
quality with and without efforts to improve quality.  
 
The Model 
We assume purchases occur in two periods (t=1, 2) with two producers i and j who may offer 
products of high quality or low quality. In the first period, producers i and j choose whether or 
not to promote their products and/or whether or not to improve the quality of their products. The 
cost of promotion is A. If the producers choose the GI, each producer incurs the cost A/2 since 
they share the cost. If a producer individually chooses to use BA, it incurs the cost A. The cost of 
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product improvement is F. It is assumed that other costs of production are zero. For simplicity, it 
is also assumed that FA γ= , with 1≤γ . 
Each consumer only purchases one unit of the good per period t (Mussa and Rosen, 
1978). A consumer who buys one unit of the product from producer i at price tip  has an 
expected indirect utility equal to ti
t
i pqE −)(θ , where ( )tiE q  is the expected quality. The mass 
of those consumers is normalized at 1, with a uniformly distributed parameter θ ∈ [0, 1]. For 
simplicity, we assume that consumers only want to get high quality (denoted Hq ) and they get 
no satisfaction from getting low quality ( 0q =A ). 
Consumers have limited knowledge about quality. In the first period (t=1), the consumer 
has a belief about the probability of getting high quality from producer i equal to αλ αiI+ , 
with 10 ≤+≤ αλ αiI . Parameter λ  is the initial belief about wine quality in the absence of 
promotion, and αiI  is an indicator linked to the promotion strategy. 
α
iI =1 means that producer i 
invests in promotion (BA or GI) for enhancing the consumer’s perception of quality in the first 
period, while αiI =0 means producer i avoids investing in promotion. Parameter α is the 
incremental probability of purchasing wine of high quality. 
In the second period (t=2), consumers repeat their purchases by learning the average 
quality of the products because of an imperfect experience. Consumers can communicate with 
each other after the first period, so that common knowledge is formed regarding the average 
quality of the products among consumers. Consumers experience the product even if they know 
there is residual uncertainty that limits their knowledge. They learn about the probability of 
getting high-quality products by using complementary information (communication among the 
consumers, newspapers, and so forth). The probability of getting high-quality products depends 
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on the producer’s decision for improving quality at cost F. The cost F implies an improvement of 
the probability of having high-quality products equal to e. Under BA, consumers are able to 
identify each producer’s improvement since promotion is individual. If producer i chose BA, the 
probability of having high-quality products is eI ei+λ  (with 0 1eiI eλ< + ≤ ), where λ  is the real 
probability of getting high-quality products in the absence of an effort. eiI  is an indicator of the 
probability improvement ( eiI =1 when F is incurred and zero otherwise). If both producers chose 
GI, consumers are not able to distinguish precisely the quality of both producers since the 
promotion is collective. Because GI leads to a collective reputation, the probability for 
consumers to get high-quality products in the absence of distinction between both producers 
is ( ) / 2 ( ) / 2 ( ) / 2e e e ei j i jI e I e I I eλ λ λ+ + + = + + , with ji ≠ . 
We summarize all the cases faced by producers and consumers in Table 2. Recall that the 
low quality is Lq =0, so that the expected quality for consumers is equal to their belief regarding 
the probability of getting high quality multiplied by the quality level, Hq . 
 
Table 2. Producers’ strategy and consumers’ expectation of producers’ quality ( Lq = 0) 
First Period Second Period 
Producer i’s Strategy 
(Producer j’s 
Strategy) 
Cost incurred 
by producer i 
and j 
Consumer’s 
expected quality of 
producer i and j 
Consumer’s expected 
quality of producer i and j 
No signal  
(No signal)* 
e
iI F λ Hq  ))(5.0( eII ejei ++λ Hq  
GI 
(GI)* 
e
iI F+0.5A ( αλ + ) Hq  ))(5.0( eII ejei ++λ Hq  
BA 
(BA)* 
e
iI F+A ( αλ + ) Hq  )( eI ei+λ Hq  
BA 
(No signal)** 
e
iI F+A 
( ejI F) 
( αλ + ) Hq  
(λ Hq ) 
)( eI ei+λ Hq  
( ( )ejI eλ + Hq ) 
*Identical values for i and j. **No signal/(BA) is obtained by switching the payoff rows of BA/(No signal). 
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The game proceeds in three stages in the first period. At the first stage, the producers 
make their decisions for promoting their products, namely GI, BA, or no signal. In the second 
stage, each producer decides whether or not to make an effort to improve the probability of 
producing high-quality goods. In the third stage of the first period, each producer selects a 
quantity (Cournot competition), and consumers decide on their consumption levels. They learn 
partial information through consumption. Stage 4 corresponds to the second period, whereby the 
consumers repeat their purchase and each producer selects a quantity (Cournot competition). The 
timeline of the stages is shown in Figure 2. We now turn to the presentation of the producers’ 
choices. 
 
The Producers’ Choices 
 
When producers choose the information strategy (in stage 1) and the effort strategies (in stage 2) 
that maximize their profits, they take into account the quantity choices in stages 3 and 4. The 
sub-game perfect equilibrium is detailed in Appendix 1 and 2.  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
Figure 2. Timeline of the game 
 
First Period 
Promotion 
Strategies  
Quality 
Improvement 
Cournot  
Competition 
First Purchase 
by Consumers  
Cournot 
 Competition 
Second Purchase  
by Consumers  
Second Period 
Stage 1  Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4  
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The incentive for a producer to select promotion and/or an effort balances two opposing 
effects. An information/effort strategy leads to higher demand for its products by increasing the 
consumer’s willingness to pay. However, this positive effect may be offset by the fixed cost 
induced by these strategies or by the strategic interaction with the other producer. The producers’ 
choices depend on the efficiency of both promotion (represented by parameters αλ , , and γ ) and 
effort (represented by the parameter e). 
The selection of the profit-maximizing strategies leads to a set of results (Propositions 1-
4). The derivations are shown in the appendix. For sake of simplicity, we characterize the 
equilibrium strategies for alternative values of γ , namely, the relative cost of promotion 
compared to the cost of quality improvement (recall that A= Fγ ). Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the 
market equilibrium detailed in the propositions. The X-axis represents the quality level, Hq , and 
the Y-axis represents the fixed cost, F. The relative values of Hq  and F determine the producers’ 
optimal strategy and define the limits of different areas (the frontiers of these regions are detailed 
in the appendix). Below, we present the propositions and provide an intuitive interpretation. Let 
)215636()34(
)215636()34(
222
222
1 λλλα
λλααλαγ +++
+++=
eee
e        (1) 
Proposition 1: When the relative cost of signaling is low with 1γγ ≤ , the producers’ strategies 
are as follows (see Figure 3):  
 (a) both producers choose no signal and no producer makes an effort in area 1, 
 (b) one producer chooses BA and no producer makes an effort in area 2, 
 (c) one producer chooses BA and makes an effort in area 3, 
 (d) one producer chooses BA and both producers make an effort in area 4.  
The proof is given in Appendix 1. 
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In area 1, making the effort or using a signal is too costly, since the respective costs 
represented by F (and Fγ ) are relatively large. When F decreases in areas 2, 3 and 4, the 
different strategies of an effort and signal become affordable for the producer(s). When the cost 
of signaling is low with 1γγ ≤ , each producer will try to use the BA alone, since it increases the 
perception differentiation and the profit by means of the parameter α  in the first period and the 
individual reputation in the second period. This market mechanism leads one producer to choose 
BA instead of cooperating with the other producer to select GI since the cost of signaling is 
relatively small. 
0
1F
2
3
4
Hq
One producer chooses BA
Two producers make the effort
F1 F2
One producer chooses
BA and the effort
F3
No Signal
No Effort One producer chooses BA
No Effort
 
Figure 3. The strategies with low relative cost of signaling ( 1γγ ≤ ) 
 
In area 2, one producer chooses BA because of the low cost of signaling (smallγ ), and no 
producer makes an effort because of the relatively high cost of the effort compared with the 
signal cost. When the relative value of F decreases further (area 3), the producer choosing the 
BA chooses to make an effort. In area 3, the fixed cost is still quite high for the other producer to 
select a signal or an effort. When F is relatively small (area 4), both producers make an effort. 
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Only one producer chooses the BA that allows a perceived increased quality differentiation in 
period 1.  
As α, the incremental probability of purchasing wine of high quality coming from 
promotion, is assumed to be the same under BA and GI, the market equilibrium with the two 
producers selecting BA never emerges. Indeed, it is optimal for both sellers to join the GI and to 
share the cost of promotion. 
We now turn to a situation in which the cost of promotion increases. Let 
)153116()34(
))75112()328(66360)(38(
)153116()34(
))2536(4)9(248180(4
222
2232
222
2232
2
λλλα
λαλαλαλλλα
λλλα
λαλαλαλαγ
+++
+++++++
+++
+++++=
eee
eee
eee
eee
    (2) 
Proposition 2: For a medium relative cost of signaling with 21 γγγ ≤< , area 2 in Figure 3 
disappears. 
The proof is given in Appendix 1. 
Since signaling is more costly, no producer selects the BA without making an effort. In 
other words, the BA is valuable only if an effort is made. Indeed compared to Proposition 1, area 
2 disappeared when γ  increased. We now turn to a situation in which the cost of promotion 
keeps increasing with 2 3γ γ γ< < 7. Let 
3
4
e
αγ =        (3) 
4
3
1
λα =       (4) 
 
                                                          
7 The relative values of 2γ  and 3γ  depend on the relative values of e,,λλ , and α . If 32 γγ > , Proposition 3 
does not exist. 
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Proposition 3: When the relative cost of signaling is of medium level with 32 γγγ ≤< , the 
producers’ strategies are as follows (see Figure 4):  
(a) both producers choose no signal and no producer makes an effort in area 1’, 
(b) both producers choose GI but no producer makes an effort in area 5, 
 (c) both producers make an effort; one producer chooses BA if 1αα >  and both of them choose    
     GI if 1αα <  in area 6. 
The proof is given in Appendix 1. 
When the cost of promotion continues to increase, the GI becomes more attractive 
compared to the BA because the producers share the cost of promotion. Areas 3 and 4 from 
Figure 3 disappear, since the cost of BA becomes too high for a single producer to afford. In 
Figure 4, the producers lean toward [choose] GI rather than doing BA individually. Some new 
equilibria appear in Figure 4.  
In reference to area 4 of former Figure 3, here, in Figure 4, GI replaces BA for large 
values of F. The story in area 6 is the following: if signaling is not persuasive up to a certain 
level ( 1αα < ), producers would choose to cooperate with each other and do GI to share the fixed 
cost. However, if signaling is effective and α  is greater than some certain level 1α , one 
producer would do BA to distinguish itself from the other in the first period to gain higher profit.  
Proposition 4: When the relative cost of signaling is high ( },max{ 32 γγγ > ) the producers’ 
strategies are as follows (see Figure 4):  
(a) no producer chooses any signal strategy and no producer makes an effort in area 1’,  
(b) both producers make no signal but both producers make an effort in area 7, and  
 
 15
0
1’
F
5
Hq
Two producers make the effort
F4
GI  
No Effort
No Signal
No Effort F5 if  BA
F6 if  GI
BA by one producer if α>α1
GI  if  α < α1
6
 
Figure 4. The strategies with medium relative cost of signaling ( 32 γγγ ≤< )  
 
(c) both producers make an effort; one producer chooses BA if 1αα >  and both of them choose    
     GI if 1αα <  in area 6’. 
The proof is given in Appendix 1. 
Proposition 4 is illustrated in Figure 5. In this case, the cost of signaling is so large that 
even the effect of cost-sharing of GI does not work well. Therefore, area 5 in Figure 4 
disappears. As the cost of making an effort continues to decrease, producers choose to make an 
effort instead of signaling in area 7. In reality, this corresponds to a new technology, which 
decreases the fixed cost of investing in quality improvements. 
From the foregoing four propositions, we can conclude that the strategies of the 
producers depend on the relative effectiveness of providing quality improvements and signaling. 
When signaling is more effective and the fixed cost of providing a quality effort is large, 
producers tend not to make an effort; when quality improvement is more effective and the fixed 
cost of signaling is large, producers tend not to signal. We also conclude that BA provides 
producers with a higher incentive to make an effort than GI does, since GI is a collective 
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reputation. If the effort for improving quality is selected, a producer will prefer to rely on BA for 
promoting its wine and set up its own reputation. Despite the sharing of the cost of promotion, a 
GI does not sufficiently reward the effort for improving quality because of the common 
reputation. On the contrary, when the producer avoids making an effort, GI is selected to be the 
promotion strategy. In this case, producers take advantage of sharing of the cost of promotion 
and collective reputation.  
0
1’
F
Hq
Two producers make the effort
F7
No Signal
No Effort
No Signal
Two producers
make the effort
F8 if  BA
F9 if  GI
7
6’
BA by one producer if  α >α1
GI  if  α < α1
 
Figure 5. The strategies with high relative cost of signaling ( { }2 3max ,γ γ γ> ) 
 
Extensions 
In defining the analytical framework, restrictive assumptions were made for simplicity. Some of 
the results of the model are robust if we consider the following extensions.  
(i) In our model we abstract from the combination of GI and BA. One extension could be 
the incorporation of this combination. The following assumption could be made: In the first 
period, GI enhances the consumer’s expectation by α  and costs producers 
2
A ; BA enhances the 
consumer’s expectation by α  as well but costs producers A ; and the combination of the two 
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enhances the consumer’s expectation by αc  and costs producers 
2
3A . When the combination of 
these two are effective (high αc  compared with the cost 
2
3A ), the producers would choose the 
combination; if the combination were not effective enough, producers would choose GI or BA 
individually, which goes back to the propositions of this paper. Let  
}
)92416(3
1414192432,1min{ 2234
332234
1 λαλαα
λαλαλαλαα
++
−−−+=c  and when 1cc < , the combination of 
BA and GI is dominated by BA or GI in equilibrium and it never emerges. (See the proof in 
Appendix 2 [point viii]).  
(ii) In our model, signaling has an effect only in the first period. One extension could be 
the introduction of an effect of signaling on consumers’ expectation in the second period. That is, 
the second period’s expectation of consumers is the combination of the expectation of the first 
period and the real probability. For example, when producers choose GI, consumers’ expectation 
in the second period is [ ))(1())(5.0( αλϕλϕ +−+++ eII ejei ] Hq , where 10 ≤≤ϕ . The higher 
the effectiveness of signals in the second period, the closer is consumers’ expectation to the real 
probability. By doing this, we introduce an interaction effect of signaling and making an effort. 
We expect that producers’ incentive to make an effort is lower when the second-period 
effectiveness of signaling is lower.  
(iii) Our model abstracts from the discount of the second-period profit of the consumers. If 
there is a discount in the second period, the larger the discount, the lower is the producers’ 
incentive to make an effort.  
(iv) In the model, we abstracted from a context with numerous producers. Since GI has the 
property of cost-sharing, one natural question is, if there are numerous producers, will the 
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producers prefer GI to BA since they could share the promotion cost by doing GI? To answer 
this question, we abstract from the strategy of making an effort in this extension. Suppose there 
are n producers. They could choose to do GI together to share the signal cost in the first period. 
When the signal cost is not quite high, the producers have the incentive to deviate to do BA by 
themselves. Suppose initially all producers do GI and the first producer chooses to deviate from 
GI to BA only if 
1
)1(
1
))1(2(
)()( 22
2
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−++
++
<
n
nnn
nn
A
λα
λααλ
. The results indicate that even 
though by doing GI a larger number of producers lower the cost of promotion for each producer, 
the producers still have an incentive to deviate to do BA if the promotion cost is not quite high. 
By doing GI, the producers share not only the cost but also the profit.8  
(v) We considered only one region. One extension of our model is the introduction of 
several regions. Probabilities of producing high-quality goods are different across different 
regions. We expect that producers in a region with high probability have more incentive to do 
GI.  
(vi) We assumed vertical differentiation. An alternative solution is to introduce horizontal 
differentiation. In this context with m consumers and perfect information, m1 consumers prefer 
goods from producer 1 and (m-m1) consumers prefer goods from producer 2. Using our model 
we expect that as m1 increases, producer 1’s incentive to signal and make an effort increases. 
(vii) We assumed the BA and GI have the same α, which is the incremental probability of 
purchasing wine of high quality from consumers’ subjective point of view. That is, BA enhances 
consumers’ perception in the first period in the same way as GI. This leads to the conclusion that 
the case in which both producers choose BA as their promotion strategy and both make an effort 
                                                          
8 The proof of the results is available from the authors upon request. 
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(or both producers make no effort) is dominated in equilibrium by the strategies that both 
producers choose GI and both producers make an effort (or both producers make no effort). (See 
the proof of point (iii) in Appendix 2.) One extension of our model is to assume that BA and GI 
have different effects on consumers’ perception in the first period. Suppose we assume the 
incremental probability of purchasing wine of high quality in the first period for BA is BAα , 
whereas for GI the value is GIα . When 
2
9AGIBA >−αα (>
n
An 2)1( +  when there are n 
producers), the strategy that both producers choose BA emerges. That is, producers do BA 
instead of GI if BA is somewhat more effective in enhancing consumers’ perception in the first 
period than GI.  
 
Conclusions  
In the context of the international wine market, we explored producers’ choice between 
promotional strategies (BA and GI) and quality improvement strategies and how these strategic 
choices affect consumers’ wine purchasing decisions. Although admittedly stylistic, our model 
nonetheless highlights the complicated strategies for monitoring uncertain quality.  
We show that the producers’ choice depends on the relative efficiency of promotional 
strategies compared with that of making an effort to improve quality. Another important result is 
that if the effort for improving quality is selected, a producer would like to use BA for promoting 
its wine and set up its own reputation. In spite of its advantage in allowing producers to share the 
cost of promotion, a GI does not sufficiently reward the effort for improving quality since it 
promotes a collective reputation. However, when the producer chooses not to make an effort to 
improve the quality, a GI is selected to be the promotion strategy. In the latter case, by using a 
GI, producers can take advantage of the sharing of the cost of promotion and collective 
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reputation. We further explored extensions of our analysis showing it is quite promising for 
further generalizations.   
These results can be applied to draw some implications about the diverging fortunes of 
“new-world” and European wines. Emergence of wines from the new world leads to new 
contexts of competition that require the modification of signaling strategies. There are more 
incentives for producers to differentiate themselves by improving quality and revealing more 
information. Our paper, however, shows that GI is not necessarily compatible with quality 
improvement. This means that producers inside a GI should revamp their strategies for 
promotion, as, for instance, with the development of generic advertising for the world market 
based on a well-identified appellation. This may also result in the concentration of wine brands 
and advertising. Of course, the diverging fortunes of new-world and European wines hinge on 
additional factors, which we abstracted from to focus on promotion and quality improvement 
strategies. Beyond these two aspects, access to capital, regulations, cost structure, and size—all 
play an important role in the evolution of the international wine market.  
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APPENDIX 1  
The consumer’s demand and producers’ profits are presented before detailing the proof of 
propositions, with the characterization of the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of this four-
stage game (solved by backward induction). 
The consumer utility is ∑
=
−
2
1
)(
t
t
i
t
i pqEθ  by consuming the product by producer i (i=1 or 
2). In period t (t=1 or 2), if the two producers choose the same strategy, then ttt qqEqE == )()( 21  
and ttt ppp == 11 . When 0=− tt pqθ , the consumer is indifferent between buying and not 
buying a product in period t, implying that her taste parameter  is t
t
t
q
p=θ . As the distribution 
of preference is uniform, the demand for the product is t
t
t
q
px −=1  and ttt qxp )1( −= . In 
period t, if the two producers choose different strategies, then the expected quality of the 
products from two producers are different: tt qqE 11 )( = and tt qqE 22 )( = . Suppose tq1 > tq1  
(indicating tp1 >
tp2 ); the consumer’s demand for producer 1’s product is tt
tt
t
qq
pp
x
21
21
1 1 −
−−= . The 
demand for producer 2’s product is t
t
tt
tt
t
q
p
qq
pp
x
2
2
21
21
2 −−
−= . By solving the system of equations of 
tt
tt
t
qq
pp
x
21
21
1 1 −
−−=  and t
t
tt
tt
t
q
p
qq
pp
x
2
2
21
21
2 −−
−=  for tp1  and tp2 , we get ttttt xqxqp 22111 )1( −−=  and 
)1( 2122
tttt xxqp −−= .  
In stage 2, each producer chooses a level of quantity, taking into account the quantity of 
the other producer. For the case in which the two producers’ strategies are different, the profit for 
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the higher expected quality producer is  
∑ ∑
= =
′−−−−=′−−=
2
1
2
1
111221111111 ))1((
t t
etttttett AIFIxxqxqAIFIqp ααπ  
and the profit for the lower expected quality producer is  
∑ ∑
= =
′−−−−=′−−=
2
1
2
1
22221222222 )1(
t t
ettttett AIFIxxxqAIFIqp ααπ . 
A′  is the fixed cost associated with information strategies: AA =′  if BA is chosen and 
2
AA =′ if 
GI is chosen. The first-order conditions for the maximization of 1π  with respect to tx1  (namely, 
0
1
1 =∂
∂
tx
π
) and 2π  with respect to tx2  (namely, 0
2
2 =∂
∂
tx
π
) lead to equilibrium prices ∗tx1  and 
∗tx2 . The substitution of these equilibrium quantities into 1π  and 2π  leads to the following 
respective profits for producer 1 and producer 2:  
AIFI
qq
qqq e
t
tt
ttt
′−−−
−=∑
=
∗ απ 11
2
1
2
21
2
211
1 )4(
)2(
   (A1.1) 
AIFI
qq
qq e
t
tt
tt
′−−−=∑=∗ απ 22
2
1
2
21
2
12
2 )4(
    (A1.2) 
A particular case of (A1.1) and (A1.2) is when both producers choose the same strategies in both 
periods (which leads to ttt qqq == 21 ): 
AIFIq i
e
i
t
t
i ′−−=∑
=
∗ απ 2
1 9
 i=1 or 2                        (A2) 
The decision on the choice of strategies in stage 1 depends on these profits, which in turn 
depends on the expected quality and fixed costs listed in Table 2 of the main text. In stage 1, 
each producer faces the choices of strategies listed in the first column of Table 2. The decision 
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depends on the comparison among the profits. Table 2 lists all the cases of the expected qualities 
and associated costs by choosing different strategies for the two producers. If the expected 
qualities for the two producers are the same, substitute them in (A2) and get the profits for the 
two producers. If the expected qualities for the two producers are different, substitute them in 
(A1.1) and (A1.2) and get the profits for the two producers.  
We use 
i
IstrategyIstrategy ee )(2)(1 21 +π  to denote producer i’s profit, with producer 1 choosing 
strategy 1 and producer 2 choosing strategy 2 and an effort-making decision ( 1=eiI  means 
making an effort; 0=eiI  means avoiding making an effort). Among the strategies, no signal is 
denoted by n, GI is denoted by GI, and BA is denoted by BA. For example, 2 )1()1( nBA +π  denotes 
producer 2’s profit when producer 1 chooses BA and makes an effort and producer 2 chooses no 
signal but makes an effort.  
 
The Frontiers Determination and Proof of Propositions 
We now turn to the equilibrium strategies that lead to Propositions 1, 2, 3, and 4.  
The Nash equilibrium is such that a producer will choose a strategy that leads to a higher 
profit than all other available strategies given the other producer’s strategy.  
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
If no signal and no effort is a Nash equilibrium, the producers have no incentive to 
deviate to other strategies; that is, the corresponding profits should be largest. Therefore, the 
following conditions have to be satisfied:  
1 1
(0) (0) (1) (0)n n n nπ π+ +>  and 2 )1()0(2 )0()0( nnnn ++ > ππ                                    (A2.1) 
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1
)0()0(
1
)0()0( nBAnn ++ > ππ  and 2 2(0) (0) (0) (0)n n n BAπ π+ +> ;   (A2.2) 
1
)0()0(
1
)0()0( GIGInn ++ > ππ  and 2 )0()0(2 )0()0( GIGInn ++ > ππ ;   (A2.3) 
Applying point(i) in Appendix 2, (A2.1) leads to the inequality 
F> 1 18 H
ef q= ; 
(A2.2) leads to  
F>
2 2
2 2
(36 56 21 )
9 (4 3 ) H
f qα α αλ λγ α λ
+ += + ;  
and (A2.3) leads to  
3
2
9 H
F f qαγ> = . 
No matter what value γ  takes, the condition 
2 2
2 3 2
(4 8 3 ) 0
(4 3 ) H
f f qα α αλ λγ α λ
+ +− = >+  is satisfied, 
which implies 2 3f f> . By comparing 1f  and 3f , we have when 3 4e
αγ γ< = , 1f < 3f .  
 
If producer 1 choosing BA and no effort and producer 2 making no signal and no effort 
is Nash equilibrium, the following conditions have to be satisfied after applying point (iii) in 
Appendix 2 (the strategy that both producers choose BA is dominated in equilibrium):  
1
)0()0(
1
)0()0( nnnBA ++ > ππ                   (A3.1) 
1
)0()1(
1
)0()0( nBAnBA ++ > ππ                    (A3.2) 
  1 1(0) (0) (0) (1)BA n BA nπ π+ +>                   (A3.3) 
1 1
(0) (0) (0) (0)BA n GI GIπ π+ +>                    (A3.4). 
 
(A3.1) leads to 
F<
2 2
2 2
(36 56 21 )
9 (4 3 ) H
f qα α αλ λγ α λ
+ += + ; 
(A3.2) leads to  
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F>
2 2
4 2
(36 56 21 )
9(4 3 ) H
e e ef q
e
λ λ
λ
+ += + ; 
42 ff >  implies )215636()34(
)215636()34(
222
222
1 λλλα
λλααλαγγ +++
+++=<
eee
e ; otherwise, we have 42 ff < .  
According to point(iv) in Appendix 2, the strategy that one producer chooses BA and makes no 
effort and the other producer makes no signal and makes an effort is dominated in equilibrium so 
(A3.3) is ignorable.  
(A3.4) leads to  
F<
2 2
5 2
8 (5 8 3 )
9 (4 3 ) H
f qα α αλ λγ α λ
+ += + ; 
 
2 2
5 2 2
2 (4 8 3 ) 0
9 (4 3 ) H
f f qα α αλ λγ α λ
+ +− = >+ , which implies 25 ff > .  
Therefore, only when 
)215636()34(
)215636()34(
222
222
1 λλλα
λλααλαγγ +++
+++=<
eee
e  does the case emerge that one 
firm makes BA and no firm makes the effort to improve quality. By comparing 1γ  and 3γ we 
have 1 3γ γ< for sure, which implies 2f > 3f > 1f  when 1γγ < . Therefore, when 1γγ < , we have  
1F =
2 2
2 2
(36 56 21 )
9 (4 3 ) H
f qα α αλ λγ α λ
+ += +  
and  
2F =
2 2
4 2
(36 56 21 )
9(4 3 ) H
e e ef q
e
λ λ
λ
+ += + . 
 
So if 1γγ <  when F> 1F , the strategy emerges in equilibrium that both producers make no signal 
and no effort and when 2F <F< 1F , the strategy emerges in equilibrium that one producer chooses 
BA and makes no effort and the other producer makes no signal and no effort.  
If producer 1 choosing BA and making an effort and producer 2 making no signal and 
no effort is Nash equilibrium, the following conditions have to be satisfied (when the second 
producer does not deviate to make an effort to improve quality):  
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1 1
(1) (0) (0) (0)BA n BA nπ π+ +>                      (A4.1) 
2 2
(1) (0) (1) (1)BA n BA nπ π+ +>                          (A4.2) 
1 1
(1) (0) (1) (0)BA n GI GIπ π+ +>                      (A4.3) 
                                    1 1(1) (0) (1) (0)BA n n nπ π+ +>                         (A4.4). 
 
(A4.1) leads to  
F< 2F =
2 2
4 2
(36 56 21 )
9(4 3 ) H
e e ef q
e
λ λ
λ
+ += + ; 
(A4.2) leads to  
F>
2 2
6 2
(16 31 15 )
9(4 3 ) H
e e ef q
e
λ λ
λ
+ += + ; 
(A4.3) leads to  
F<
2 3 2 2
2
7 2 3 2 2
2
8 (112 45 16 (5 11 ) 6 (20 11 ))
9 (4 3 )
(8 3 )(168 72 8 (16 33 ) 3 (64 33 ))
9 (4 3 )
H
e e e
e
f q
e e e
e
α αλ α λ λ α λ
γ λ
αλ λ αλ α λ λ α λ
γ λ
⎛ ⎞+ + + + +⎜ ⎟+⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟+ + + + + ++⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
. 
According to point(vii) in Appendix 2, (A4.4) is ignorable. 
2 2
4 6 2
(20 25 6 ) 0
9(4 3 ) H
e e ef f q
e
λ λ
λ
+ +− = >+ , which implies 4 6f f> . And we also have 7 4f f> . 
One producer choosing BA and making effort and the other producer choosing no signal 
but making effort is a Nash equilibrium when the following conditions are satisfied:  
2 2
(1) (1) (1) (0)BA n BA nπ π+ +>                      (A5.1) 
1 1
(1) (1) (1) (1)BA n n nπ π+ +>                          (A5.2) 
             1 1(1) (1) (1) (1)BA n GI GIπ π+ +>                         (A5.3) 
(A5.1) leads to  
F<
2 2
6 2
(16 31 15 )
9(4 3 ) H
e e ef q
e
λ λ
λ
+ += + ; 
(A5.2) leads to  
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    F<
2 2
2 2
(36 56 21 )
9 (4 3 ) H
f qα α αλ λγ α λ
+ += + . 
According to the point(v) in Appendix 2, GI is dominated by BA when 1γ γ< ; (A5.3) is 
ignorable. Since 42 ff >  and 4 6f f> , we have 2 6f f> . Therefore, we have the frontier 
3F =
2 2
6 2
(16 31 15 )
9(4 3 ) H
e e ef q
e
λ λ
λ
+ += + . 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
When 1γ γ> , 2F > 1F , the strategy in which one producer chooses BA and makes no effort and 
the other producer makes no signal and no effort does not emerge in equilibrium, which leads to 
Proposition 2. The frontier 1F  becomes the border between area 1 and area 3, so when 1γ γ> , 
2 3 2 2
2 2
1 2 3 2 2
2 2
4 (144 81 12 (18 7 ) 16 (9 14 ))
9(1 )(4 3 ) (4 3 )
(8 3 )(108 63 21 (8 3 ) 56 (2 3 ))
9(1 )(4 3 ) (4 3 )
H
e e e
e
F q
e e e
e
α αλ λ α λ α λ
γ λ α λ
αλ λ αλ λ α λ α λ
γ λ α λ
⎛ ⎞+ + + + +⎜ ⎟+ + +⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟+ + + + + ++⎜ ⎟+ + +⎝ ⎠
. 
We need to compare 3F  and this new 1F . Area 3 emerges only if 1F > 3F ; otherwise, area 3 
disappears. 1F > 3F  only if 2γ γ< , where 
)153116()34(
))75112()328(66360)(38(
)153116()34(
))2536(4)9(248180(4
222
2232
222
2232
2
λλλα
λαλαλαλλλα
λλλα
λαλαλαλαγ
+++
+++++++
+++
+++++=
eee
eee
eee
eee
 
and 1 2γ γ< . 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
When 2γ γ> , area 2 and area 3 in Figure 3 disappear. It’s possible that GI emerges in 
 31
equilibrium (it was dominated when area 2 and area 3 emerge according to point(v) in Appendix 
2). The strategy that both producers choose no signal and none of them makes an effort to 
improve quality emerges in equilibrium if the following conditions are satisfied:  
1
)0()0(
1
)0()0( GIGInn ++ > ππ  and 2 )0()0(2 )0()0( GIGInn ++ > ππ ;   (A6.1) 
  1 1(0) (0) (1) (0)n n n nπ π+ +>     and 2 2(0) (0) (0) (1)n n n nπ π+ +> .                        (A6.2) 
(A6.1) leads to  
F> 3
2
9 H
f qαγ= ; 
(A6.2) leads to  
                                                    F> 1 18 H
ef q= . 
When 2γ γ> , the strategy that both producers choose GI and none of them makes an 
effort to improve quality emerges in equilibrium if the following conditions are satisfied:  
1 1
(0) (0) (0) (0)GI GI n nπ π+ +>  and 2 2(0) (0) (0) (0)GI GI n nπ π+ +> ;             (A7.1) 
                  1 1(0) (0) (1) (0)GI GI GI GIπ π+ +>  and 2 2(0) (0) (0) (1)GI GI GI GIπ π+ +> .            (A7.2) 
(A7.1) leads to  
F< 3
2
9 H
f qαγ= ; 
(A7.2) leads to  
                                                    F> 1 18 H
ef q= . 
GI would emerge only if 1 3f f< , which implies 3 4e
αγ γ< = . We cannot rank 2γ  and 3γ . So if 
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2γ > 3γ , GI would not emerge, either.  
So when 2 3γ γ γ< < , 
4F = 3 29 Hf q
α
γ= . 
The strategy that both producers choose GI and both of them make an effort to improve 
quality emerges in equilibrium if the following conditions are satisfied:  
1 1
(1) (1) (1) (1)GI GI n nπ π+ +>  and 2 2(1) (1) (1) (1)GI GI n nπ π+ +> ;                    (A8.1) 
                1 1(1) (1) (0) (1)GI GI GI GIπ π+ +>  and 2 2(1) (1) (1) (0)GI GI GI GIπ π+ +> ;                  (A8.2) 
                1 1(1) (1) (1) (1)GI GI BA nπ π+ +>  and 2 2(1) (1) (1) (1)GI GI n BAπ π+ +> .                      (A8.3) 
(A8.1) leads to  
F< 3
2
9 H
f qαγ= ; 
(A8.2) leads to  
F< 1 18 H
ef q= ; 
(A8.3) leads to 
α <
4
3
1
λα = . 
When 3γ γ< , we have 1 3f f< , so  
5F = 1 18 H
ef q= . 
When α > 1α , 6F is the border between area 5 and the strategy that both producers make an effort 
and one of them uses BA: 
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6F =
2 2
2
8 (4 5 ) (16 6 )(3 4 )
9(2 )(4 3 )
e eα α αλ λ α
γ α λ
+ + + +
+ + . 
6F < 4F  only when 
2
4 2 2
2 (4 3 )
4 (4 ) (8 3 )(3 )e e
α α λγ γ α α αλ λ α
+> = + + + + , where 4 3γ γ< . 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
When 2 3max{ , }γ γ γ> , we have 1 3f f>  so the strategy that both producers choose GI and make 
no effort does not emerge; that is, area 5 in Figure 4 disappears. Both producers choose no signal 
and both of them make an effort to improve quality if the following conditions are satisfied:  
1 1
(1) (1) (1) (1)n n GI GIπ π+ +>  and 2 2(1) (1) (1) (1)n n GI GIπ π+ +> ;                    (A9.1) 
                1 1(1) (1) (0) (1)n n n nπ π+ +>  and     2 2(1) (1) (1) (0)n n n nπ π+ +> ;                          (A9.2) 
                   1 1(1) (1) (1) (1)n n BA nπ π+ +>  and 2 2(1) (1) (1) (1)n n n BAπ π+ +> .                        (A9.3) 
(A9.1) leads to  
F> 3
2
9 H
f qαγ= ; 
(A9.2) leads to  
F< 1 18 H
ef q= ; 
(A9.3) leads to 
F>
2 2
2 2
(36 56 21 )
9 (4 3 ) H
f qα α αλ λγ α λ
+ += + . 
So, in Figure 5,  
7F = 1 18 H
ef q= ; 
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8F = 3 29 Hf q
α
γ= ; 
9F =
2 2
2 2
(36 56 21 )
9 (4 3 ) H
f qα α αλ λγ α λ
+ += + . 
9 7F F<  only when 
2 2
5 2
2 (36 56 21 )
(4 3 )e
α α αλ λγ γ α λ
+ +> = + , where 5γ > 3γ . 
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APPENDIX 2 
The following strategies are dominated: 
(i) Both producers choose no signal, and one of them chooses to make an effort. 
(ii) Both producers choose GI, and one of them chooses to make an effort. 
(iii) Both producers choose BA. 
(iv) The strategy in which one producer chooses BA and makes no effort and the other 
producer makes no signal and makes an effort is dominated in equilibrium.  
(v) The strategy in which both producers choose GI and make no effort is dominated by 
the strategy in which one producer chooses BA and makes no effort and the other 
producer chooses no signal and no effort if the latter strategy emerges (the 
emergence of the latter strategy depends on the values of the parameters).  
(vi) The strategy in which both producers choose GI and make an effort is dominated by 
the strategy in which one producer chooses BA and the other producer chooses no 
signal and both producers make an effort when α >
4
3
1
λα = . 
(vii) The strategies in which both producers choose GI and make an effort, or both 
producers choose no signal but make an effort are dominated by the strategy in 
which one of them could choose BA and make an effort and the other producer 
chooses no signal and makes no effort if the latter strategy emerges. 
(viii) One producer chooses the combination of GI and BA; another producer chooses GI 
alone; and both of the producers choose the combination of GI and BA.  
Proof of Points (i) and (ii) 
The strategy in which both producers use no signal, producer 1 makes an effort, and producer 2 
makes no effort is not dominated when the following conditions are satisfied. Producer 1 does 
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not deviate to make no effort and producer 2 does not deviate to make an effort. That is, 
1
)0()0(
1
)0()1( nnnn ++ > ππ ,   (B1.1) 
2
)1()1(
2
)0()1( nnnn ++ > ππ .   (B1.2) 
(B1.1) is satisfied by Hq
eF
18
<  and (B1.2) is satisfied by HqeF 18> ; these two cannot be 
satisfied at the same time, so the strategy is dominated in equilibrium. Similar proof applies to 
point (ii). 
Proof of Point (iii) 
FAqe H
i
BABA −−+++=+ 9
)()(
)1()1(
λαλπ , which is always less than 
FAqe H
i
GIGI −−+++=+ 29
)()(
)1()1(
λαλπ , i=1,2. So the producers would rather choose GI 
and make an effort to achieve the same profit with a lower cost. 
Proof of Point (iv) 
The case in which producer 1 chooses BA and makes no effort and producer 2 makes no signal 
but makes an effort is not dominated when the following necessary conditions are satisfied: 
producer 1 does not deviate to make an effort and producer 2 does not deviate to make no effort. 
That is, 
1
)1()1(
1
)1()0( nBAnBA ++ > ππ ,   (B2.1) 
 
2
)0()0(
2
)1()0( nBAnBA ++ > ππ .   (B2.2) 
(B2.1) is satisfied by F>
2 2
6 2
(16 31 15 )
9(4 3 ) H
e e ef q
e
λ λ
λ
+ += +  and (B2.2) is satisfied by 
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F<
2
8 4 3 H
e ef q
e
λ
λ
+= + , but 
2 2
6 8 2
4 (5 8 3 )
9(4 3 ) H
e e ef f q
e
λ λ
λ
+ +− = − + <0, so the necessary conditions 
cannot be satisfied.  
Proof of Point (v) 
The strategy in which producer 1 chooses GI and makes no effort is not dominated when the 
following necessary conditions are satisfied: producer 1 does not deviate to make no signal and 
make no effort, and producer 1 does not deviate to choose BA alone. That is, 
 1 )0()0(
1
)0()0( nnGIGI ++ > ππ ,   (B3.1) 
 1 )0()0(
1
)0()0( nBAGIGI ++ > ππ .   (B3.2) 
(B3.1) is satisfied by HqfF γ
α
9
2
3 =< , and (B3.2) is satisfied by 
F>
2 2
5 2
8 (5 8 3 )
9 (4 3 ) H
f qα α αλ λγ α λ
+ += + , but 3f < 5f , which cannot satisfied.  
Proof of Point (vi) 
The case in which producer 1 chooses BA and makes an effort and producer 2 makes no signal 
but makes an effort is not dominated when the following necessary conditions are satisfied: 
producer 1 does not deviate to choose GI and make an effort and producer 2 does not deviate to 
choose GI and make an effort. That is, 
 1 )1()1(
1
)1()1( GIGInBA ++ > ππ    (B4.1) 
 
 2 )1()1(
2
)1()1( GIGInBA ++ > ππ    (B4.2) 
 (B4.1) is satisfied by 
2 2
5 2
8 (5 8 3 )
9 (4 3 ) H
F f qα α αλ λγ α λ
+ +< = +  and (B4.2) is satisfied by 
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2
9 2
2 ( )
9 (3 4 ) H
F f qλ α λ λ αγ λ α
⎛ ⎞+ +> = −⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠ . When 4
f < 9f (which indicates α > 4
3
1
λα = ), the 
strategy in which producer 1 chooses BA and makes an effort and producer 2 makes no signal 
but makes an effort is not dominated, but the strategy in which both choose GI and make an 
effort is dominated. When 4f > 5f  (which indicates α < 4
3
1
λα = ), the strategy that producer 1 
chooses BA and makes an effort and producer 2 makes no signal but makes an effort is 
dominated, but the strategy in which both choose GI and make an effort is not dominated. 
Proof of Point (vii) 
Both producers choose GI and make an effort when the following necessary conditions are 
satisfied: producers do not deviate to make no effort and one of the producers does not deviate to 
choose BA and make an effort conditional on the other producer choose no signal and make no 
effort. That is: 
 
1
)0()1(
1
)1()1( nBAGIGI ++ > ππ    (B5.1) 
 
1
)1()0(
1
)1()1( GIGIGIGI ++ > ππ    (B5.2) 
(B5.1) is satisfied by 
2 2
10 2 2
2 ( )( 2 ) ( )( 2 )
(3 4 ) 9 (3 4 ) 9 H
e e eF f q
e
λ α λ α λ α λ λ λ
γ λ α λ
⎛ ⎞+ + + + + +> = − + −⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠  
and (A7.2) is satisfied by 1 18 H
eF f q< = . But 
3 2 2
10 1 2
16 (5 ) 45 8 (10 (16 3 ) ) 3 (40 (16 3 ) )
18(3 4 ) H
e e ef f q
e
γ αλ α γ λ λ α γ λ
λ
− + + + − + + −− = + >0. So the 
necessary conditions cannot be satisfied. Similar proof could apply to the case that both 
producers make no signal but make an effort. 
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Proof of Point (viii) 
The necessary condition for producer 1 to choose the combination of GI and BA as the 
marketing strategy if it has no incentive to deviate to do BA alone, which means: 
 
1
)0()0(
1
)0()0( nBAGIGIBA ++ > ππ    (B6.1) 
The condition above leads to the frontier below whereby the strategies in which one producer 
chooses the combination of GI and BA and another producer chooses GI alone will emerge in 
equilibrium. 
2 2
11 2 2
2 ( )((2 1) ) ( )(2 )
((4 1) 3 ) (4 3 ) H
c cf q
c
λ α α λ λ α α λ
γ α λ α λ
⎛ ⎞+ − + + += −⎜ ⎟− + +⎝ ⎠  
When this frontier is below the horizontal axis in Figure 3 of the main text, the strategy that one 
producer chooses the combination of GI and BA, the other producer chooses GI alone, and none 
of them makes an effort is dominated by the strategy that one producer chooses BA, the other 
producer makes no signal, and none of them makes an effort. That is, 11f <0, which generates 
c<
)92416(3
1414192432
2234
332234
11 λαλαα
λαλαλαλαα
++
−−−+≈c . The exact value of 11c is rather complex. 
The expression above gives the approximate value by ignoring the smaller order of this value. 
Similarly, the strategy in which both producers choose the combination of GI and BA is 
dominated by the one in which both of the producers choose GI in equilibrium when c<1. 
Then, }
)92416(3
1414192432,1min{ 2234
332234
1 λαλαα
λαλαλαλαα
++
−−−+=c . 
